Supply chain attacks target the build
Compromising one dependency reaches everyone downstream. Attestations turn "we think this is our binary" into something a machine can check.
Ship releases your customers can verify
Build provenance for containers, packages and binaries, generated inside the pipelines you already run and checked automatically before anything reaches production.
Compromising one dependency reaches everyone downstream. Attestations turn "we think this is our binary" into something a machine can check.
Procurement questionnaires now ask about build provenance and SBOMs. Having an answer that is generated rather than written is a shorter conversation.
An attestation standard nobody checks at deploy time is documentation. The value is in the gate, not the record.
Containers, packages and binaries carrying SLSA provenance and in-toto attestations that record how they were built and from what.
in-toto attestations linking source, build and artifact so the chain is inspectable rather than asserted.
SPIFFE identities for the services and agents that run the result, authorised at runtime across trust boundaries.
Plugs into: Version control · Your build pipelines · Artifact repositories · Policy at the deployment gate
Policy is evaluated at the point of decision, so unattested or untrusted artifacts do not ship.
The same rules apply whether the artifact is a container, a package or a binary.
The audit trail is a by-product of building, not a document someone maintains.
Publish with proof attached
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Run media production like a secured pipeline
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Turn content and AI policy into a control you can evidence
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Stand behind what you issue, under your own name
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Attest what you produce, verify what you consume
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Tell us how you build and release, and where the artifacts travel.